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Abstract:  This paper analyzes the evolution of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), 
America’s oldest stock exchange, from 1964 through 2002.  The paper seeks to explain how the 
PHLX managed to attract a sufficient volume of trading orders to support its members and cover 
its operating costs during this period, and how it adapted to survive in an era with profound 
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I.  Introduction 
This paper analyzes the evolution of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) from 1964 
through 2002.  In doing so, it addresses one central question.  Over this time period, how did the 
PHLX manage to attract a sufficient volume of trading orders to support its members and cover 
its operating costs?  
  Answering this question provides a detailed analysis of how one small securities ex-
change adapted in the face of seismic shifts in its competitive environment.  That is, the paper 
tells a rich story of the evolution of one exchange while profiling, in the background, major 
changes in the structure of U.S. securities markets over the past several decades.  At the same 
time, the paper emphasizes the role that the largely overlooked regional exchanges have played 
in securities markets over the past few decades.   
  In examining the evolution of the PHLX from 1964 through 2002, I identify four distinct 
periods.  The first runs from 1964 through 1974.  I begin in 1964 because in 1963 the Securities 
and Exchange Commission issued a report providing a fairly comprehensive overview of the 
evolution of U.S. securities markets, including the regional exchanges, up to that time (SEC, 
1963).  I end the first period in 1974 because this is the last year that exchanges could, and did, 
require their members to charge nonmembers specified minimum commissions for trading equi-
ties.  In addition, during this period, the PHLX only traded equities; not the options that became 
important to it in later years.  The second period begins in 1975 and ends in 1983.  This is an era 
  1of great innovation for the PHLX as it introduced automated routing and execution of retail eq-
uity trades and began to trade equity options, equity index options, and foreign currency options.  
The third period runs from 1984 through 1999.  During this era, the PHLX enjoyed the benefits 
of its earlier diversification into options.  It is also a time when the exchange seriously consid-
ered merging with another exchange, and perhaps even closing its operations in Philadelphia.  
The last period begins in 2000 and runs through the end of 2002.  During this time, a number of 
developing regulatory and technological threats to the most successful market niches of the 
PHLX came to fruition.  The exchange has tried to find new products and business strategies to 
replace or supplement these niches, but it is too early to know whether these efforts will succeed.   
  Over several of the years covered in this paper, the PHLX experienced a variety of sig-
nificant and insignificant scandals involving members of its top management and board of direc-
tors.  These scandals, however, are largely irrelevant to the fundamental factors driving the evo-
lution of the exchange, so I do not discuss them here.  In addition, to keep the paper reasonably 
brief, I do not discuss in detail the business strategies of the securities exchanges that competed 
with the PHLX.  
  Before discussing the evolution of the PHLX, I should note that stock exchanges, and or-
ganized over-the-counter markets, fulfill a number of functions.  By providing a centralized loca-
tion for people to meet who are trying to buy or sell securities, they reduce search costs.  In set-
ting membership criteria, trading rules, and adjudication processes, they reduce contracting costs.  
Restrictions on direct access to an exchange and pricing and trading rules can also be used to 
limit competition to the advantage of exchange members and other securities market profession-
als.   
  2  In some cases, economic theory would predict that there would be only one exchange or 
OTC market, collectively called “market centers,” to trade any particular security or group of 
securities.  This is true because securities markets are subject to “network effects.”
1  This simply 
means that people buying (or selling) a security will tend to go to the market center where there 
is the largest number of others selling (or buying) same security.  This maximizes the likelihood 
that they will receive the best price possible or complete the transaction quickly.  This point, 
which is often stated as “liquidity attracts liquidity,” has important implications.  If a market cen-
ter, for example, gains a dominant market share in trading a particular security, all trading of the 
security may quickly move to that market.  In other words, network effects can create natural 
monopolies for market centers.  In determining which market center becomes the location for 
trading a particular security, there is a “first mover” advantage.  Whichever market center first 
gains a dominant trading share, perhaps because it is the first center to trade the security, is more 
likely to become the monopoly center than later entrants.    
  One would not expect to find a unique market center for each security.  Market centers 
are likely to become trading locations for numerous securities.  This is partly due to economies 
of scale.  Once a market center develops the infrastructure (trading floor, computers, manage-
ment structure, etc) to facilitate trading in one security, many of these expenses will not grow 
proportionally as the center begins to trade more securities.  If the economies of scale are large 
enough, a market center could become a natural monopoly for the trading of all securities.  More 
modest economies of scale could result in numerous centers, each of which trades a group of se-
curities.  Another factor that explains why a market center may become trading points for multi-
ple securities is economies of scope.  If investors or market makers who trade security X also 
                                           
1 Larry Harris (2003) provides an especially clear discussion of network efforts in trading sys-
  3tend to trade security Y, they may reduce their transaction costs by trading X and Y in the same 
market center.  Thus, if a market center gains a dominant market share in trading one security, it 
may become the main or only trading center for complementary securities.   
  Over the period that I examine in this paper, the Philadelphia stock exchange managed to 
survive, and sometimes thrive, while capturing only a relatively minor share of total national 
trading of exchange-listed stocks and options.  If network effects, economies of scale, and 
economies of scope are significant, one would have expected it to have folded as trading mi-
grated to far larger market centers, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for exchange-
listed equities and the Chicago Board Options Exchange for exchange-traded options.  Why 
didn’t it? 
  The rest of the paper seeks to answer this question.  Before plunging into the details, 
however, it is useful to consider at an abstract level several factors than can allow a small market 
center to compete with a much larger center.   
  When a market, such as the NYSE, obtains significant power from its dominant position 
as a trading center, this can create conditions that lead to niches for competing small market cen-
ters.  It is natural, for example for the dominant market to use its power to raise prices for access-
ing the market.  It can use the resulting revenue to benefit its shareholders, managers, or mem-
bers in the case of a not-for-profit exchange.  Government may also seek to share in the monop-
oly profits by imposing special taxes on the dominant market center.  A market center, with sig-
nificant monopoly power, may tend to provide poor service to outsiders and, perhaps, may be 
slow to introduce service-enhancing or cost-reducing innovations.   The tendency for a dominant 
market center to try to extract economic rents and to become operationally inefficient can offset 
                                                                                                                                        
tems and factors affecting competition among markets. 
  4the advantages that the market center gains from network effects and economics of scale and 
scope.  This creates an opening for other market centers to attract trading orders (Huang and 
Stoll, 1996). 
  Regulatory barriers can also prevent a large market center from extinguishing a smaller 
center.  Until recently, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission gave different op-
tions exchanges the exclusive right to trade particular option contracts.  Under such a system, a 
dominant options exchange could not take business away from a smaller exchange since it did 
not have the right to trade the same contracts as the smaller exchange.   
  Principal/agent issues are a third factor that can enable a small market center to coexist 
with a dominant center.  Specifically, it may be in the interest of an investor to direct his trading 
orders to the dominant market because he will get the best price or execution there.  But it may 
be in his broker’s interest, through whom he must place his orders, to direct the orders to the 
smaller market, perhaps because the broker receives a payment for doing so.  If the investor does 
not recognize that he should monitor the broker or cannot monitor the broker, then the orders 
may be directed to the smaller market center, enabling it to survive despite the competitive ad-
vantages of the dominant market center.   
  A fourth factor than can explain the persistence of competing market centers is heteroge-
neity in market structure preferences among traders.  Some traders, for example, may be willing 
to accept slower execution of trades in order to obtain a more favorable price.  Others may be 
willing to accept a less favorable price in exchange for faster executions.  Competing markets 
may persist because they have different structures which better meet the needs of different trad-
ers.   
  5  Finally, a small market center can compete with a dominant center if network effects, 
economies of scale, or economies of scope are relatively weak.  People who trade or make mar-
kets in options on equities, for example, may only very rarely trade foreign currency options.  If 
so, it may be possible for a small market center to trade foreign currency options in competition 
with a large center that attracts nearly all trades in equity options.   
  
II. Evolution of the PHLX 
  This section attempts to answer the question:  Why were trading orders directed to the 
PHLX at different points in time?  As noted earlier, in answering the question, I focus on four 
eras: 1964 through 1974, 1975 through 1983, 1984 through 1999, and 2000 through 2002.    Be-
fore doing so, however, I briefly review the pre-1964 evolution of the PHLX.   
 
A.  Brief pre-1964 history 
  The Philadelphia Stock Exchange dates its founding to the 1790 licensing of the Phila-
delphia Board of Brokers, making it the oldest stock exchange in the country.
 2  Between its 
founding and the mid-19
th century, the Philadelphia exchange mainly traded government debt 
and the securities of local banks, insurance companies, and bridge and turnpike companies.
3    
                                           
2 Over the years, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange has had a variety of names and office loca-
tions.  But it has always been located in Center City Philadelphia with one exception.  In De-
cember 1968, in response to a fiscal crisis, Philadelphia imposed a $0.05 per share stock transfer 
tax for all transactions on the PHLX.  On January 2, 1969, the PHLX moved its trading floor to 
an office building just across the street from the city boundaries to avoid the tax.  In February, a 
Court ruled that the tax was illegal, and the PHLX moved its trading floor back to its headquar-
ters in the City.  
3 Robert E. Wright (2002) provides data on the volume of trading prior to the 1850s, the types of 
securities traded, and the typical brokerage commissions.   
  6  Although the New York Stock Exchange was founded about two years after the PHLX, it 
soon surpassed the PHLX in trading volume.  As Walter Werner and Stephen Smith (1991, p. 
184) write, “Reliable comparisons for the trading years 1837-1840 reveal that reported share 
volume in Philadelphia was on average 13.9 percent of the volume in New York…”  The promi-
nence of the NYSE was due to New York’s preeminent position in commerce generally.  New 
York, unlike Philadelphia, was linked to the Great Lakes region as a result of the 1817 construc-
tion of the Erie Canal, and its ports were better positioned for shipping back and forth to Europe.  
By the 1850s, the U.S. was actively developing a national telegraph network.  This facilitated the 
creation of large national corporations that sought to list their securities on the NYSE because of 
the deep pools of capital in the city.
4  The development and deployment of the ticker tape over 
the 1870s further reinforced the tendency to trade in New York since brokers located anywhere 
in the country could follow nearly contemporaneous stock prices on the NYSE.   Regional ex-
changes, including the PHLX, responded to the success of the NYSE by listing and trading the 
securities of firms that could not meet the listing requirements of the NYSE.  These tended to be 
younger and smaller firms than those traded on the NYSE.  
  Reflecting the strength of Philadelphia’s industrial base and its financial district, the 
PHLX remained the nation’s second largest exchange for much of the 19
th century.  In the latter 
half of the century, trading emphasized the securities of rail systems, mining companies, insur-
ance firms, and banks with headquarters in the Philadelphia region.   
  The major regional exchanges, including the PHLX, boomed in the 1920s.
5  This was due 
partly to the overall boom in stock markets.  In addition, prior to the Securities and Exchange 
                                           
4 Richard DuBoff (1983) provides a rich account of how the telegraph influenced U.S. financial 
markets.    
  7Act of 1934, listing requirements were quite lax on most of the regional exchanges.  Since many 
states exempted any company listed on an exchange, whether regional or national, from their 
“Blue Sky” laws, this created a strong incentive for weak firms seeking to raise funds from the 
public to list on these exchanges.  In the boom of the 1920s, listings and trading on the regional 
exchanges increased rapidly.  In 1923, for example, 2.3 million shares were traded on the PHLX, 
about 1 percent of the volume of the NYSE.  By 1929, 35.5 million shares were traded on the 
PHLX, about 3.1 percent of NYSE volume.  In the subsequent stock market crash and economic 
depression, many of the firms listed on the regional exchanges failed or were absorbed in merg-
ers, and trading volume fell precipitously.  In 1932, for example, only 6.6 million shares traded 
on the PHLX.  In addition, states changed their Blue Sky laws to limit exemptions for securities 
listed on regional exchanges, and the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
required the exchanges to impose stricter listing requirements.  These developments greatly de-
creased listings and trading volume on the regional exchanges.
6  Gradually the over-the-counter 
market replaced the regional exchanges as the location where newly issued equities would trade 
and become “seasoned” before the issuing firm might seek a listing on the NYSE or the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange (AMEX).     
  As the regional exchanges lost listings and trading volume, they responded by starting to 
trade widely held securities listed on the NYSE and the AMEX.  In 1931, for example, the 
                                                                                                                                        
5 The data in this paragraph come from the 1963 study by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC, 1963, pp. 916-7).   
6 In its 1963 Special Study, the SEC explained that “…since the disclosure standards of the new 
statute exceeded the equivalent standards of the principal exchanges, companies meeting these 
standards might well seek the greater publicity and prestige of a listing on the New York ex-
changes in preference to a regional listing…The new statutory requirements …also tended to 
shift the trading of securities from the regional exchanges to the over-the-counter mar-
ket…[S]ecurities traded over the counter were free of the requirements now attached to securities 
traded on an exchange.” (SEC, 1963, p. 918) 
  8PHLX allowed trading to begin in any security listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, and some re-
gional exchanges.  Since these securities were generally not listed on the PHLX, this was called 
“unlisted” trading.  Not surprisingly, the NYSE challenged the move by the regional exchanges 
to trade securities listed on the NYSE, but in a series of decisions over the 1930s the SEC de-
cided in favor of the regional exchanges (SEC, 1963, pp. 919-24).   Subsequently, the regional 
exchanges began to trade mainly securities listed on one of the New York exchanges. The PHLX 
was no exception to this trend.  By 1961, only 1.2 percent of the dollar volume of stock trading 
on the PHLX came from the 88 stocks that had sole listings on that exchange (SEC, 1963, Table 
VIII-76).  The vast majority of stocks traded on the PHLX were in stocks listed on the NYSE.   
  Even with this shift toward the trading of securities listed on the NYSE and AMEX, most 
of the regional exchanges saw a fairly consistently decline in their market share of total ex-
change-listed trading between 1930 and 1960.  Many of the regional exchanges closed or merged 
with other regional exchanges during this period.
7  The PHLX was no exception.  In 1949 it 
merged with the Baltimore exchange, and in 1953 it merged with the Washington DC exchange.   
In both cases, the PHLX was the far larger exchange in the merger and the surviving exchange 
maintained its headquarters in Philadelphia.   Despite these mergers, as shown in Graph 1, the 
dollar volume of equity trading on the PHLX was quite low in the early 1950.
8  It picked up in 
the latter half of the 1950s, but this was largely due to a general increase in the volume of trading 
overall.  As shown in Graph 2, over the 1950s, the market share that the PHLX had in exchange-
traded equities hovered fairly consistently around 1 percent.   It is no wonder that the 1963 SEC 
                                           
7 The paper by Tom Arnold et al (1999) contains a thoughtful analysis of the economic forces 
behind the mergers of the regional exchanges between 1940 and 1960.   
8 The data from 1950-53 of graphs 1 and 2 combine the volume of the PHLX and the Washing-
ton DC exchanges.  As noted in the text.  The two exchanges merged in 1953.  At the time of the 
merger, volume on the PHLX was 50 times as great as that on the DC exchange. 
  9study discussed the general decline in the role of the regional exchanges and questioned their 
prospects for survival.    
Graph 1 










1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963






















  10Graph 2 









1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963































  As the PHLX evolved into an exchange that mainly traded equities listed on the NYSE, it 
also evolved to resemble more closely a dealer market rather than an auction market.  This was 
also true of the other regional exchanges.  In most cases, the only person buying or selling a par-
ticular stock on the floor of the exchange was the designated specialist.  There were no compet-
ing market makers on the floor and it was very rare for brokers representing buy and sell orders 
to interact directly.
9  The counterparty to almost all trades was the specialist.
10  The specialist’s 
                                           
9 In some cases, brokers on the floor would execute large orders with each other, but they gener-
ally negotiated these trades off the floor of the exchange.  Brokers would execute the pre-
arranged trade, known as a “cross,” on the PHLX or another regional exchange rather than the 
NYSE because there were far fewer limit orders on the books of the regional exchanges that 
would have to participate in the trade based on time or price priority.  Such block transactions 
could therefore execute more smoothly on a regional exchange than on the NYSE. 
10 Although the SEC did not provide data for the PHLX in particular, in discussing the trading of 
securities traded on the NYSE or the AMEX and a regional exchange, it explained that, “The 
specialist participates as a dealer in approximately 90 percent of all multiple trading on the re-
gional exchanges” (SEC, 1963, p. 932). 
  11profits depended on the spread between his bid and ask price, multiplied times the volume of his 
trades.  Because the specialists on the PHLX were small, poorly capitalized operators compared 
to those on the NYSE, the PHLX specialists typically sought to execute a steady flow of small 
retail orders.  
While the specialists on the PHLX rarely faced competition for orders from the floor of 
the exchange, they did compete to attract trades in equities that were traded on other exchanges.  
To help attract this order flow, the specialists would generally guarantee that their prices would 
be as good, or nearly as good, as those quoted on the NYSE.  This practice was common on the 
regional exchanges.  As the SEC (1963, pp. 914-5) explained in its 1963 study, the regional ex-
changes sought “… to assure investors as good an execution on the regional exchange as they 
might receive of the principal market.  This led to the development of systems to gear prices on 
the local exchange to those reported on the NYSE ticker tape.”  In discussing how this system 
operated on the PHLX, the SEC noted that a specialist would sometimes transact at price that 
was 1/8
th ($0.125) inferior to the last printed transaction price on the NYSE.  Brokers who di-
rected orders to these specialists did not consider this to be a breach of fiduciary responsibilities 
to their customers.  They reasoned that, “…had the order been sent to New York, there is no cer-
tainty that the quote is the market in which the customer would have dealt since there might have 
been orders ahead of his or the market might have changed by the time his order arrived.” (SEC, 
1963, p. 934).  In a limited set of cases, a specialist on the PHLX would match the price quoted 
on the NYSE.  As the SEC (1963, p. 934) reported:  
If there are a great many ‘prints’ of GM at 56 on the NYSE tape the [PHLX] spe-
cialist will execute the order at 56 without waiting for the stock to sell in New 
York at 56 1/8.  The transaction ‘on volume’ will occur when the volume of sales 
in New York at the limit price is such as would indicate that the firm can receive 
an execution at 56 in New York. 
 
  12  There are a variety of reasons brokers directed orders for securities listed on the NYSE to 
the PHLX.  Small- and medium-sized brokerage firms with their headquarters in the mid-
Atlantic region were often members of the PHLX but not the NYSE since membership in the 
PHLX required far less capital.  If such firms received an order to trade a security listed on the 
NYSE and they directed it to a member of the NYSE for execution, they would have to pay the 
“public” fixed commission paid by all nonmembers.
11  This would reduce or eliminate their 
profit from originating the order.  If such firms, on the other hand, executed the order on the 
PHLX, they could keep most of the public commission paid by their customers, paying only a 
minor member commission to the PHLX.
  
                                          
  Firms that were solely members of the PHLX would direct some orders to the NYSE, ei-
ther because of the size of the trade or because the security was not traded on the PHLX.  They 
would have to choose a NYSE member to execute these orders on their behalf and pay the public 
commission.  Because the cost of executing an order on the NYSE for a member was far below 
 
11 Members of an exchange pay a small commission to the exchange for all trades that they exe-
cute on the floor of the exchange.  This commission helps cover the overhead costs of the ex-
change.  Nonmembers who with to trade on an exchange must ask a member to execute the trade 
on their behalf.  The nonmembers pay the member a “public” commission for handling the trade.  
Prior to 1975, all of the exchanges required their members to change a specified minimum public 
commission.  The specified minimum commission was higher than what a free-market commis-
sion would have been, so all members charged the specified minimum commission and did not 
compete for orders on the basis of price.  The minimum public commission was specified on a 
per-share basis, so large volume institutional traders paid the same commission per share as 
small retail traders.  In addition, with only minor exceptions, all of the exchanges specified iden-
tical minimum public commissions (SEC, 1963, p. 299-300). An investor could avoid paying the 
minimum commission by directing a trade in a listed security to an over-the-counter dealer who 
made a market in that stock.  But Rule 394 of the NYSE prohibited member firms from routing 
trading orders for listed stocks to OTC dealers.  They were not, however, prevented from routing 
trades to regional exchanges.   Rule 394 also prohibited NYSE member firms from acting as 
OTC dealers for listed securities.  The effect of these rules was to limit access to the so-called 
“third market” to institutional investors that had the necessary communication facilities to com-
municate directly with OTC market makers and to compare the prices on the third market to 
those on the NYSE.      
  13the minimum public commission, members competed aggressively to attract orders from non-
members.  The NYSE did not permit its members to discount public commissions or offer cash 
rebates in competing to attract orders, but the members could reward nonmember brokerage 
firms that were members of a regional exchange by sending them orders to execute on the re-
gional exchange.  In this way, the brokerage firm that was a sole member of a regional exchange 
could indirectly earn public commissions for handling orders that it directed to a NYSE member.  
Such orders were referred to as “reciprocal” order flow, and they accounted for a significant 
share of the trades directed to the PHLX and other regional exchanges prior to the liberalization 
of public commissions.   
     The largest brokerage firms that were members of the PHLX were often also members of 
the NYSE.  In research conducted for its 1963 study, the SEC surveyed 41 of these firms to ask 
them why they would direct some of their order flow to the PHLX rather than the NYSE.  About 
half of the firms cited “to retain a larger percentage of the commission” as the most important 
reason (SEC, 1963, p. 1086).  This reason was likely cited by dual members that did not have 
execution and clearing facilities in New York, for they would have to pay another member of the 
NYSE to handle these tasks for them (SEC, 1963, p. 938).   Another common reason that the 
firms gave for directing orders to the PHLX was “to save paying the New York State transfer 
tax.”  At that time, New York imposed graduated tax on the trading of stocks.  For stocks that 
traded for $20 or more per share, the tax was $0.04 per share traded.  Pennsylvania had no such 
tax.  Thirteen of the 41 firms said that they direct some trades to the PHLX to “reduce market 
impact on the NYSE.”   These firms were undoubtedly breaking up block orders.  Several dual-
member firms reported that they directed trades to the PHLX as part of a reciprocal arrangement 
with another member of the PHLX.  Finally, 10 of the 41 dual members said that they direct 
  14some trades to the PHLX because, “Orders originating in the vicinity of the exchange.” This 
likely refers to a desire for some Philadelphia area investors, bank trust departments, and broker-
age firms to support local business interests.   
  Although the overwhelming majority of trading on PHLX was in NYSE-listed securities, 
the securities of Philadelphia area firms accounted for a disproportionate share of trades on the 
floor of the PHLX in the early 1960s.  Undoubtedly, the explanation for this observation is that 
ownership of Philadelphia area firms, especially at the retail level, was concentrated in the Phila-
delphia region.  When these owners traded their shares, they were more likely to use regional 
brokerage firms that were members of the PHLX.  Between 1962 and 1964, for example, the 10 
most actively traded stocks on the PHLX in one or more of these years included the Philadelphia 
Electric Company, Scott Paper Company, Sperry Rand Corporation, Pennsylvania Railroad 
Company, and Philadelphia Transportation Company (PHLX Annual Reports, 1962-64).  All of 
these companies were based in the Philadelphia metropolitan region.   
 
B.  1964 - 1974 
In the modern era, 1964 through 1972 were the best years for equity trading on the Phila-
delphia Stock Exchange.  As shown in Graph 3, the dollar volume of shares traded on the PHLX 
grew rapidly from 1962 to 1969.  It grew explosively from 1970 through 1972 before declining 
just as precipitously between 1972 and 1974.  As shown in Graph 4, the growth in the dollar vol-
ume of trading on the PHLX between 1962 and 1968 was only sufficient to increase slightly its 
market share of exchange-traded equities.  However, the explosive growth between 1969 and 
1972 represented a 150 percent increase in its market share. The 1972-74 fall in trading volume 
was partly due to a decline in overall volume in exchange-listed equities and partly due to a de-
  15cline in the market share of the PHLX.
12  This section discusses the major developments that ac-
count for the changes in the market share of the PHLX from 1964-74.   
Graph 3 
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12 Table 1A in the Appendix presents the overall dollar trading volume of exchange-listed securi-
ties and the market shares of the exchanges. 
  16Graph 4 
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Much of the growth in the PHLX’s trading volume between 1964 and 1968 came from 
trades generated by mutual funds.  As noted earlier, the NYSE and the regional exchanges im-
posed minimum public commissions with no volume discounts.  Since the cost to a member firm 
of handling and executing a trade for a nonmember was well below the minimum commission, 
firms competed intensely to attract trading orders from the public, especially large volume 
trades.  Were no rules to prevent it, brokerage firms that were members of the NYSE would have 
undoubtedly begun to offer cash rebates to block-traders that directed orders to them.  But NYSE 
rules prevented cash rebates by members to nonmembers.  Members could only share commis-
sions with other members.  In the early 1960s, most of the regional exchanges had similar rules 
to the NYSE --- a member of an exchange could only share trading commissions with other 
members of that exchange.
13   
                                           
13 As of 1963, the Pacific Coast, Detroit, and Cincinnati exchanges permitted some discounting 
of commissions for nonmember brokerage firms (SEC, 1963, p. 936).  As noted below, by the 
  17  At the same time, the Investment Company Act of 1940 placed a cap on the commissions 
that mutual funds could pay retail sales organizations.  Mutual funds often wished to exceed this 
cap in order to sweeten the incentive for retail brokerage firms to sell shares in their funds.  They 
found several ways to evade the cap.  If a firm that sold shares in the mutual fund was a member 
of the NYSE, the mutual fund could reward it by asking it to execute trades on its behalf, paying 
the firm the fixed commission for this service.  If the mutual fund preferred to use its traditional 
NYSE-member firm for executing trades, it could direct that firm to share its trading commission 
with another NYSE-member firm that the mutual fund wished to reward.  This was known as a 
“give up.”  But many small brokerage firms that sold shares in mutual funds to retail clients were 
not members of the NYSE.  If they were members of a regional exchange, there was a way to 
reward them for these sales.   Assuming that the firm that traditionally executed trades for the 
mutual fund was also a member of the regional exchange, the mutual fund could ask the firm to 
execute some trades on the regional exchange and share the commissions with the member firm 
that the mutual fund wished to reward.  In the early 1960s, such arrangements accounted for a 
substantial share of the order flow on regional exchanges (SEC, 1963, p. 316-7).  The regional 
exchanges could handle the associated large block trades because the trades were often pre-
arranged off the floor of the exchange.   
  In 1965, to attract even more business based on mutual fund directed give-ups, the PHLX 
changed its rules to permit commissions to be shared with brokerage firms that were not mem-
bers of the PHLX (1965 PHLX Annual Report).  Since some small brokerage firms that sold 
                                                                                                                                        
mid-1960s the PHLX and other regional exchanges joined these three exchanges in permitting a 
form of discounting through commission-sharing with nonmember brokerage firms.    
  18shares in mutual funds were not members of any exchange, mutual funds could direct trading 
orders to the PHLX in order to reward them.
14  
  A second factor that increased the market share of the PHLX in the mid-1960s was an 
increase in taxes on security trades in New York City.  As the PHLX explained in its 1966 An-
nual Report, “A one cent increase in the New York Stock Transfer Tax, from four to five cents 
during the year, advertised the fact that there had been no such tax for many years in any of the 
States where regional exchanges are located.  This attracted block orders to all of them…”  
  The New York Stock Exchange was, of course, unhappy to see trades that would nor-
mally be executed on its floor diverted to regional exchanges.   It lobbied the SEC to halt all cash 
give-ups.  The SEC agreed with the NYSE that give-ups could undermine fixed trading commis-
sions and the cap on mutual fund sales commissions.  In December 1968, all commission split-
ting ended when the exchanges agreed to ban the practice under pressure from the SEC (Business 
Week, January 3, 1970, p. 74). 
  The loss of institutional business associated with the end of give-ups could have been a 
major blow to the PHLX.  It was not, however, because the PHLX instituted two new measures 
to attract institutional trades.  In the 1960s, the NYSE did not allow institutions active in a wide 
range of activities to become members of the exchange.  Membership was open only to entities 
whose primary purpose was serving the public as brokers or market makers.  In addition, the 
NYSE did not permit foreign-owned securities firms to become members.  This forced large for-
                                           
14 Other regional exchanges adopted similar give-up provisions.  As Business Week (January 3, 
1970, p. 74) reported in 1970, “[The regionals] raked in heavy trading from institutional inves-
tors because neither the Big Board nor the AMEX allowed give-ups of commissions to nonmem-
bers…Thus, whenever a mutual fund, for example, wanted to reward a small brokerage firm that 
sold its shares or provided research but which did not belong to any exchange, it could direct its 
broker to place an order through one of the six regionals that permitted give-ups to nonmem-
bers.” 
  19eign banks, many of which actively traded American securities on behalf of clients, to pay the 
public commission to trade on the NYSE.  Prior to 1967, the PHLX had similar policies.  But, 
beginning in 1967, the PHLX allowed securities firms that were owned by mutual fund compa-
nies, insurance companies, foreign-owned financial institutions or other institutions to become 
members (Seligman, 1982).  By early 1971, 39 such institutionally affiliated securities firms had 
joined the PHLX and began to trade on behalf of the institutions that owned them (Wetherill, 
1971).  The institutional investors still had to pay the minimum public commission, but they paid 
it to firms owned by the institutions themselves.  In this way, mutual funds and other institutions 
that traded high volumes of equities effectively received a discount from public commissions.  
Not surprisingly, this strategy was very successful for the PHLX.  As reported in its 1969 Annual 
Report, 37 percent of its stock trading volume came from institutional trades in 1968 and 45 per-
cent in 1969.
  
  In 1968, the PHLX took a third measure to attract trading orders to the exchange.  It dou-
bled the number of seats, cutting the price of owning a seat in half.  This made it feasible for 
even very small brokerage firms to join the PHLX.  As members, if a mutual fund wished to re-
ward them for selling shares in the fund, it could pay them the standard public commission for 
handling some trades.  Business Week (January 3, 1970, p. 74) reported admiringly of the ex-
change, then known as the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington (PBW) Exchange,  
In 1968, its volume was up 25% to 48 million shares from the previous year.  In 
1969, volume rose another 23%.  Two moves initiated by the exchange’s presi-
dent, Elkins Wetherill, helped to keep trading volume high:  Doubling the number 
of seats and allowing institutions to become members.  By cutting the cost of a 
seat in half (to $16,500), small firms that sell mutual funds and which once were 
rewarded with give-ups could join and receive commissions directly…The PBW 
is also picking up business by letting the institutions become members and save 
on commissions…Liquidity is no problem because in the case of large blocks of 
stock both the sale and purchase (a so-called cross) are arranged beforehand and 
then executed on the floor of the exchange. 
  20 
Over the 1960s, not all regional exchanges were as successful as the PHLX.  Several 
failed or were absorbed.  One example was the Pittsburgh Exchange.  By 1968, its share of the 
dollar value of all equity trades on exchanges had fallen to 0.03 percent (SEC Annual Report, 
1969).  This was too little volume to justify operating the exchange, and in 1969 the PHLX 
agreed to absorb it.  Within two years, the PHLX closed the trading floor in Pittsburgh.   
  The market share of the PHLX grew strongly between 1968 and 1972.  But over this 
same period, two serious threats were on the horizon.  First, by the late 1960s there was much 
criticism of fixed trading commissions, and many influential groups were advocating deregula-
tion.  Since much of the business of the PHLX came from institutions that were trying to evade 
fixed trading commissions, freeing the commissions could threaten the viability of the exchange.  
Beginning in 1971, the exchange experienced a hint of this.  On April 5, 1971, the SEC approved 
negotiated commission rates on orders above $500,000.  This led institutions to redirect some of 
their large trades to the NYSE as they could negotiate discounted commissions.  This explains 
much of the fall in the market share of the PHLX that began in 1972.   
  In a second threat to the PHLX, beginning in 1972 the SEC began to pressure the ex-
changes to exclude from membership brokerage firms that were owned by institutional investors.  
The PHLX lobbied hard against this (Business Week, February 26, 1972).  But in 1975, Congress 
directed the SEC to adopt a ban on brokerage firms transacting business on behalf of affiliated 
institutional accounts.  This was to become effective in 1978.  As it turned out, this had little 
practical effect since fixed trading commissions were liberalized in May 1975.   
 
  21C.  1975-1983 
The period from 1975 through 1983 was one of tremendous innovation at the PHLX.  In 
equity trading, the PHLX shifted away from trying to attract the business of institutions to trying 
to attract retail trades.  More importantly, in 1975 the PHLX began to trade equity options and in 
1982 it introduced currency options.  These two products became the basis for most of the suc-
cess that the exchange had in the 1980s and 90s.   
 
Equity trading 
Beginning in May 1975, exchanges were no longer permitted to specify minimum com-
missions that nonmembers had to pay to trade on the exchanges.  This led to a rapid fall in com-
missions, especially the commissions paid per-share-traded by institutional investors.  Institu-
tions that had been directing many of their trades to regional exchanges began to return to the 
NYSE.  After all, it was the market with the most competitive bidding on the floor and the only 
exchange with the depth to absorb fairly large trades in widely-held equities.   
In 1978, there was a second major change in securities markets, the inauguration of the 
Intermarket Trading System (ITS). The ITS linked the floors of the exchanges.  It enabled traders 
on the floor of any exchange to see prices and transactions on the other exchanges and to route 
orders to another exchange.  Traders on the floor of an exchange were expected to match or ex-
ceed the best bid or offer price shown on any other exchange, known as the national best bid or 
offer (NBBO), or to route their orders to an exchange quoting the NBBO.   
   Despite the confusing terminology, a seller or buyer could conduct his or her transaction 
at the NBBO and still not receive the best price in the market.  The NBBO is the best quoted 
price to buy or sell a stock up to a specified quantity limit.  But dealers and brokers are often re-
  22luctant to quote the very best price that they are willing to pay.  This is because they hope to pay 
less than the maximum they are willing to pay, and because the maximum that they are willing to 
pay depends on how well informed they believe their counterparty is likely to be.  If a well-
informed counterparty wants to sell at price $X, the dealer can assume that the stock might well 
be worth less than $X.  Quoting conservative bid and offer prices reduces the chances that the 
dealer will be taken advantage of by well-informed traders.  However, when a typical “unin-
formed” retail order came to the floor of an exchange, such as the NYSE, where there were 
commonly several brokers and dealers competing to get such orders, the competition often 
forced them to offer prices superior to the best quoted bid or offer prices.  This “price improve-
ment” meant that investors frequently obtained a price somewhat better than the NBBO.  Price 
improvements were comparatively rare on the floor of the regional exchanges since the special-
ists generally did not face competition for orders from dealers or brokers on their floors.  The 
specialists on the regional exchanges would, as required, match the NBBO or send the trade to 
another exchange.  But they generally did not match any price improvement occurring on the 
NYSE.   
  The 1975 deregulation of brokerage commissions led to the rise of “discount” brokerage 
firms that charged low fees for providing basic retail trading services.  Since they charged low 
commissions for handling the trades, in order to make a profit they had to execute these trades at 
a very low cost.  Moreover since the profit on each trade was small, they sought to handle a high 
volume of retail trades.  Thus, the discount brokers valued fast, reliable, automated executions of 
their trades more than they valued a time-consuming or costly search for the best price possible 
for their customers’ trades.  Discount brokers argued that, in most cases, their customers gained 
  23more from low commissions than the customers would from paying higher commissions but get-
ting the small price improvements often associated with less automated executions.   
The PHLX responded to the changes that diminished its order flow from institutional 
traders by developing systems to meet the needs of retail discount brokers.  It hoped that a high 
volume of small-value order flow could sustain the exchange and its members from two sources 
of revenue.  First, the exchange could gain revenue since it was paid for reporting trade execu-
tion data to the “consolidated tape,” a system that collected trading data from all of the ex-
changes.  Second, specialists on the exchange could profit from the spread derived from func-
tioning as consistent counterparties to the retail trades.  But to attract the order flow from the 
emerging discount brokers, the PHLX had to offer automated, reliable executions at prices close 
to the best prices available anywhere.  To do so, in 1975 the PHLX introduced a computerized 
order handling and execution system, called the Philadelphia Stock Exchange Automated Com-
munication and Execution System, or PACE for short.  PACE would route an entered retail order 
to the proper specialist.  Orders that met predetermined criteria could be executed automatically 
by the specialist and the specialist would guarantee that the price of the trade would match that 
of the NBBO.
 15 
Partly in response to the automation of retail order flow by several of the regional ex-
changes and third market dealers, the NYSE also moved to automate much of its retail order 
                                           
15 Competing on this basis became common for the regional exchanges and OTC dealers.  As the 
SEC reported in its Market 2000 Study (SEC, 1994, pp A VI 40), “[Retail] orders are very rarely 
routed on the basis of quotations.  Instead, order routing decisions are made on the basis of pre-
existing arrangements where service and costs are paramount and execution quality is eliminated 
as a factor because all markets guarantee execution at the BBO.  Once the order is routed this 
way, it is rare that it will be sent to another market because the best quote will be matched in-
stead of rerouting the order via ITS.  Thus, market makers have little incentive to compete based 
on quotes.  According to the Regional Exchanges, it is more effective to compete by marketing 
  24flow with the introduction of its Designated Order Turnaround System (DOT) in March 1976.
16  
But PACE was more fully automated than DOT, something that the discount brokers valued.  
The DOT system, for example, had a built in delay to permit brokers on the floor to better the 
price offered by the specialist or displayed in the specialist’s limit book.  PACE did not have this 
feature.  By late 1977, PACE accounted for about 12% of the PHLX’s share volume.  In its 1977 
Annual Report, the PHLX explained that “…a great percentage of the volume coming through 
PACE is new order flow for the Exchange – orders which would have been diverted to other 
markets in the past.”
17   
As shown in Graph 5, between 1974 and 1983 the PHLX experienced a significant in-
crease in the dollar value of its equity trading volume.  But despite the PHLX’s efforts to attract 
a high volume of retail trades, Graph 6 shows that it lost market share relative to the combined 
share of the other exchanges.   By 1983, its market share had declined to 1.5 percent from 2.3 
percent in 1974.   In other words, despite the efforts of the PHLX to attract the order flow of re-
tail trades, the exchange lost market share as large institutional orders returned to the NYSE fol-
lowing the 1975 deregulation of fixed trading commissions.   
                                                                                                                                        
quicker and cheaper executions than by attempting to attract orders through displayed quota-
tions.”    
16 The DOT system later evolved into SuperDOT.  In 1999, SuperDot handled about 90% of 
NYSE orders accounting for about half of the exchange’s dollar trading volume (NYSE, 2000, p. 
24).  As with DOT, SuperDot does not allow for fully automated executions since NYSE rules 
require the specialist to expose incoming orders to the crowd for possible price improvements.   
17 Well into the 1980s, news accounts credited PACE with attracting significant retail order flow 
(Philadelphia Inquirer, April 18, 1986, p. c12).  
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  26Stock and index options 
On June 27, 1975, the PHLX began to trade options on equities.  It was the third ex-
change to do so.  The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) had pioneered this path when it 
began to trade stock options in April 1973.  Prior to that, options on equities had been traded 
only in an opaque over-the-counter market.  Interest in trading options on the CBOE developed 
rapidly.  In January 1975, the American Stock Exchange became the second exchange to trade 
equity options.  It was followed shortly afterwards by the PHLX and the Pacific Stock Exchange.   
When the PHLX introduced options trading, it started on a limited basis and expanded 
over time.  Initially, for example, the PHLX listed only call options on five stocks.  It slowly 
added other call options over the next few years.  The PHLX began to list put options in June 
1977.   
The main reason that the PHLX was slow to add new equity options was that the CBOE 
and the AMEX had already listed the most desirable options by the time the PHLX began to look 
for listings.  Prior to 1977, although there was no rule that prevented the exchanges from doing 
so, the exchanges rarely listed option contracts that were already traded on another exchange.  As 
I discuss below, people later charged that the options exchanges did not list each other’s options 
because of an implicit agreement to limit competition among the exchanges.  In addition, the 
SEC and the exchanges expressed concerns about multiple listing of options contracts since, 
unlike the equity exchanges, the options exchanges were not linked.  This meant that there was 
no organized system to tell traders instantly on one exchange about the quoted bid and offer 
prices and volumes on other exchanges.  And there was no process to ensure that a trade on one 
  27exchange would not occur on terms less favorable than that offered on another exchange.
 18   The 
SEC worried that public investors might be taken advantage of in such fragmented markets and 
that the continuity and liquidity of the markets could be impaired.   
Although the listing of the same option contract on more than one exchange was rare, it 
was becoming more common as the exchanges competed for order flow (Investment Dealer’s 
Digest, August 17, 1992, p. 14).  In 1977, the SEC responded to its concerns about market frag-
mentation by placing a moratorium on the listing of new equity options while it studied the op-
tions market and considered how to handle the multiple-listing issue.
19   Although the exchanges 
did not develop a linkage system during the moratorium, the SEC felt that it could not leave the 
moratorium in place indefinitely and it lifted it in March 1980.  Still concerned about multiple 
trading on markets that were not linked, in June 1980 the SEC initiated a lottery for allocating 
the right to trade any new options on equities.  Under this system, the exchanges would provide a 
list to the SEC of equity options that they wished to list.  The SEC would then use a lottery to 
allocate the exclusive right to trade these options to specific exchanges.  This system remained in 
place until 1990.  Over these ten years, the options exchanges never developed a system to link 
their markets although they were persistently pressured by the SEC to do so.   
Under the SEC lottery system, the flow of option trades to the exchanges depended on 
their ability to attract business for the options that they had listed prior to the moratorium of 1977 
and their luck in obtaining the right to list desirable equity options through the lottery.  By these 
                                           
18 Traders on the floor of one exchange could follow prices and transactions on another exchange 
by obtaining data through third-party vendors, but this still would not provide the traders with an 
inter-market order routing system. 
19 The PHLX supported this move, stating in its 1977 Annual Report, “The imposed options 
moratorium, temporarily at least, answers our request for the halt to dual option trading.  Earlier 
in the year, the PHLX attempted to call attention to a so-called dual trading war which was oc-
curring between the options exchanges in their attempts to capture increased order flow.”  
  28measures the PHLX did well.  As shown in Graph 7, the volume of equity options traded on the 
exchange grew consistently between 1975 and 1983.  After 1978, the growth was particularly 
rapid.  As shown in Graph 8, the market share that the PHLX had in equity options hovered 
around 3 percent between 1976 and 1978.  During this period, the CBOE, with its first–mover 
advantage, had over 70 percent of the market.  The AMEX’s share hovered around 20 percent.
20  
But the rapid growth in equity option trades on the PHLX between 1978 and 1983 led to a tri-
pling of its market share.  By 1983, it had almost 9 percent of the overall volume of equity option 
trades on exchanges. This created bustling activity on the options floor, for unlike the equity 
floor, it was active with market makers trading for their own account in addition to brokers and 
specialists. These were heady days among option traders on the PHLX and many boasted pub-
licly of the easy money to be made (Loren, 1983).
 21   
                                           
20 Table 2A in the Appendix provides a time series of data on the overall volume of equity op-
tions trading and the market shares of the exchanges.   
21This was also true on the currency options floor.  In both cases, the PHLX was a primary mar-
ket in which national prices were set rather than, as in the case of the equity floor, a secondary 
market that based its prices on those determined by another exchange. 
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  30At the end of 1983, there was a little noticed development in options trading that would 
later have important implications for the PHLX.  In December of that year, the exchange began 
to trade options on indices reflecting the price of the equities of firms in a particular economic 
sector (Securities Week, December 12, 1983, p. 11).
22  Since these options settled only in cash, 
one could consider them to be purely a bet on the market-weighted average price of stocks in a 
particular economic sector.  The PHLX began with two such sector indices, a precious metals 
index and a gaming/hotel index.   Initially there was little trading volume in such sector index 
options, but that would change over time.    
 
Currency options 
Although the PHLX demonstrated foresight in moving relatively early to trade equity op-
tions, it could not claim to have pioneered this development.  It simply copied the innovation that 
the CBOE had launched.  In the case of currency options, the PHLX was the innovator.   
In the late 1970s, there was a huge spot market in foreign exchange and active over-the-
counter forward and exchange-based futures markets.  There was no organized market for for-
eign exchange options.  A staff member of the PHLX at that time, Arnold Staloff, proposed that 
the PHLX should initiate trading options on foreign currencies.  With the backing of PHLX man-
agement and some key members of the exchange, he started a long and complicated process to 
obtain approval from the SEC.
23  One major complication was that laws in the U.S. treated 
foreign exchange as a commodity, and the commodity exchanges were regulated by the Com-
                                           
22 The CBOE was the first options exchange to trade a stock market index option.  It initiated 
trading on a broad market index in March 1983 (New York Times, April 11, 1983, p. D9).   The 
CBOE and AMEX began trading index options on narrower economic sectors in September 
1983 (Securities Week, September 5, 1983, p. 9). 
  31modities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).  The CFTC and the Chicago-based futures ex-
changes were determined to prevent SEC-regulated entities, such as the PHLX, from becoming 
centers for trading currency options.  Since the SEC already regulated option trading in equities, 
it was equally determined to oversee options on other financial instruments, including foreign 
currencies.  After much political and legal maneuvering, the SEC and the CFTC finally reached a 
compromise, known as the Shad-Johnson Accord, in late 1981.  Under the terms of the compro-
mise, the SEC was to oversee exchange-based trading in options on foreign currencies.  Shortly 
afterwards, the SEC approved the PHLX to start trading foreign currency options.   
The PHLX opened its currency option trading floor on December 10, 1982.  To help 
promote its new product, the PHLX initiated a series of seminars to explain to market profes-
sionals how it had structured its currency options market and to promote the use of exchange-
traded currency options for hedging and speculation.  In the first year of trading, the product ap-
peared to be headed for success (Financial Times, October 6, 1983, p. I16).  Trading volume 
started small and grew slowly but steadily.  Orders came from small scale speculators, and from 
nonfinancial and financial businesses, many based in Europe, that used the exchange to hedge 
risks. 
 
D.  1984-1999 
The period from 1984-99 was perhaps the most successful for the PHLX in modern 
times.  Volume was heavy on almost all stock markets, including the PHLX.  In addition, the two 
principal innovations of the previous period --- the introduction of equity and currency options --
                                                                                                                                        
23 The book by Gregory Millman (1995) provides an entertaining account of the efforts by the 
PHLX to develop and market foreign currency options.   
  32- brought a very high volume of order flow, and associated high incomes for many PHLX mem-
bers for extended periods of time.   
At the same time, many members and managers of the exchange worried that the success 
was likely to be short-lived.  There were no barriers to entry, other than the PHLX’s first-mover 
advantage, that would protect its dominance of currency options.  And the SEC repeatedly indi-
cated that it was dissatisfied with the monopolies that the options exchanges had in the majority 
of equity options.  The SEC pushed hard for the options exchanges to create a linkage system 
and move to multiple listings.  Few PHLX members held high hopes for the future of pure equity 
trading.  The PHLX continued to lose market share in this arena and members could foresee 
growing threats from computerized trading platforms.    
These concerns, as well as the recognition that the PHLX would have to spend large sums 
to keep its software, hardware, and self-regulatory functions abreast of other exchanges, led to 
numerous explorations of merger possibilities with other exchanges.  The PHLX held serious 
merger talks with other exchanges in 1989-91 and in 1993.  In 1998, it came very close to merg-
ing with the AMEX.
24  The merger was called off at the last minute because major changes in the 
options industry, discussed below, raised serious doubts about whether it would be advantageous 
to both parties (Philadelphia Inquirer, April 23, 1999, p. D1).  
The period from 1984 to 1999 was not one that purely relied on the innovations from the 
previous era.  During these 15 years, the PHLX made one further significant innovation.  In 
                                           
24 In June 1998 the PHLX Board tentatively agreed to a merger proposal from the AMEX.  It 
was reported that PHLX lagged in technology and thought that it had to invest many millions of 
dollars to catch up (Investment Dealers Digest, June 15, 1998).  The AMEX, on the other hand, 
had state-of-the-art technology that allowed for electronic processing of orders, cancellations and 
replacement orders. The desire of the PHLX to gain AMEX’s technology and the desire of the 
AMEX to gain PHLX’s options business were the apparent motivations for the merger. Under 
  33March 1988, after a two-year costly development effort the PHLX asked the SEC to approve its 
application to trade “cash index participations,” or “CIPs” for short.  The CIP was to trade like a 
stock but, like a futures index, its price would depend on the value of an index of stocks.  Unlike 
a futures index, the CIP would pay a quarterly dividend based on the dividends of the stocks in 
the index and it would have no expiration date.  Shortly after the PHLX filed its application with 
the SEC, the AMEX and CBOE applied to trade very similar products.
25  The PHLX asked the 
SEC to permit it to trade CIPs for several months prior to permitting the trading of similar prod-
ucts at the other exchanges, but the SEC gave its approval for the simultaneous launching of the 
products at all three exchanges.  Soon after the CIP began to trade on the options floor of the 
PHLX, the CFTC brought a lawsuit, arguing that CIP-type products were futures contracts and 
should be regulated by the CFTC and traded on futures exchanges.   In August 1989, a federal 
court ruled in favor of the CFTC and ordered the PHLX and the other stock exchanges to stop 
trading CIPs (Philadelphia Inquirer, June 19, 1990, p. E1).
26  They all did so, but the AMEX 
worked to redesign its CIP-type product to enable it to avoid designation as a product that should 
be traded on a futures exchange.
 27  In 1993, the AMEX introduced an “exchange traded fund,” 
                                                                                                                                        
the terms of the merger, PHLX’s options business would have moved to New York City.  The 
merger plans were aborted in April 1999. 
25 A former official of the PHLX told me that the PHLX and the other exchanges commonly 
faxed to each other copies of proposed routine rule changes so that they could maintain a harmo-
nized set of rules.  Accordingly to this individual, an administrative assistant at the PHLX mis-
takenly faxed copies of PHLX’s plans for the CIP to the other exchanges.  This enabled the other 
exchanges to immediately present the SEC with copy-cat proposals.   
26 Nicholas Giordano, the president of the PHLX at the time, was obviously frustrated with the 
CFTC.  Referring to Mr. Giordano, The Banker (January 1, 1990) reported, “The CFTC should 
stick to what it is good at, he suggests, ‘like regulating pork bellies’.”  
27The PHLX had a futures exchange and could have reintroduced the CIP as a futures product, 
but it did not do so.  In the view of the PHLX, the CIP could not succeed as a futures product 
since far fewer brokers were qualified to trade futures contracts than spot contracts. 
  34the replacement for the CIP.  In subsequent years this became a highly successful product for the 
AMEX.  
  In addition to creating the CIP, the PHLX opened a futures exchange, named the Phila-
delphia Board of Trade (PBOT), in May 1985 (New York Times, May 13, 1985, p. D5).  The first 
securities traded on the PBOT were cash-settled options on Eurodollars futures and a futures 
contract on an other-the-counter stock market index.  Due to a lack of interest, the exchange 
stopped trading both products in 1986.  In the same year, however, it introduced trading in fu-
tures contracts on a variety of foreign currencies.  It hoped that traders on its currency options 
floor might direct trades to the PBOT to hedge their risk exposures.  The PBOT had up and down 
years closely tied to the general activity in currency markets, but as a late entrant it never gained 
more than a tiny share of the foreign currency futures market.  In 1999, the PHLX closed the 
PBOT.  Nevertheless, during the years in which the PHLX hosted an equity trading floor, an eq-
uity options floor, a currency options floor, and a futures market, it was the most diversified ex-
change in the country.    
 
Equity markets 
As shown in Graph 9, with the exception of just a few down years, equity trading volume 
on the PHLX grew strongly from 1984-1999.  This reflected the general boom in equity markets 
over this period.  This growing order flow fed the profits of specialists on the PHLX and other 
exchanges.  But there was an important offsetting development.  As noted earlier, specialists and 
OTC dealers competed to attract retail order flow since they could profit from the spread be-
tween the bid and ask price.
  Not surprisingly, in competing for this order flow, specialists on the 
regional exchanges and OTC dealers began to offer financial incentives to brokerage firms that 
  35were willing to direct orders to them.  This became known as “payment for order flow.”  Al-
though it is not clear who initiated the practice and when, by the mid-1980s there were reports 
that the practice was common among OTC dealers (Sasseen, 1985).
  Discount brokers, who were 
competing with each other to charge the lowest trading commission, were particularly likely to 
seek payments for order flow.  These payments enabled them to cover their operating costs by 
means other than commissions.   
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There is no record of when specialists on the PHLX began to pay for order flow, but it 
likely started in the mid-1980s.
28  This helped the specialists attract the order flow but reduced 
their profits on each trade.  Thus, the profits to the specialists associated with the rapid increase 
in trading volume illustrated in Graph 9 were less than what they would have reaped without 
having to pay for much of the order flow.  
As shown in Graph 10, the market share of the PHLX between 1984 and 1992 varied be-
tween 1.2 percent and 1.8 percent.  Beginning in 1993, the PHLX began to lose market share at a 
fairly consistent rate.  By 1999, its market share was about 0.6 percent.  It is unclear exactly what 
caused this decline in market share.  One possibility is that, although specialists on the NYSE did 
not, strictly speaking, pay for order flow, in 1993 the NYSE began to offer cash credits to bro-
  37kers who executed small trades on its DOT system (Wall Street Journal, January 14, 1993, p. 
C1).   A second factor was that the NYSE made many improvements in SuperDot, its automated 
order routing and reporting system and, allegedly, pressured its members to refrain from direct-
ing orders to the regional exchanges (Osterland, 1998, and Securities Week, March 31, 1997, 
p.1).  A third factor may have been the ever increasing competition from the other exchanges.  
From 1993 to 2000, for example, the market shares of the AMEX and the Chicago Stock Ex-
change, based on the dollar volume of trading of exchange-listed securities, increased notably 
(see Appendix 1A).
 29   
  Managers and members of the PHLX were fully cognizant that the exchange needed to 
take major steps to increase the order flow on its equity-trading floor.
  In the mid-1980s, the 
management of the exchange appealed to large financial institutions located in the Philadelphia 
metropolitan area to support the exchange by directing some of their stock-trading business to 
the PHLX (Philadelphia Inquirer, April 18, 1986, p. C12).  But this appeal apparently had little 
effect.
30   
                                                                                                                                        
28 The SEC announced in early 1986 that it would informally study the use of payment for order 
flow among dealers for listed securities on the exchanges (Securities Week, February 17, 1986, p. 
4).   
29 In an effort to attract order flow, the Boston, Cincinnati, and Pacific Stock Exchanges encour-
aged affiliates of large brokerage firms to become specialists on the exchange.  On each of these 
exchanges, more than half of the specialists were affiliated with order-flow providers (SEC, 
1994, p. 71).  The brokerage firms would direct trading orders to their affiliated specialists since 
they shared the specialists’ profits.  In the early 1990s, on the PHLX only 15% of the specialists 
were affiliated with “upstairs” firms.  Most of its specialists on the equity-trading floor remained 
independent operations.  
30 In interviews, two former presidents of the PHLX told me that Boston-area financial institu-
tions have long supported the Boston Stock Exchange by ensuring that it receives some of their 
stock-trading orders.  They lamented that Philadelphia area financial institutions were not 
equally supportive of the PHLX.  This reminded me of the claim by sociologist E. Digby Baltzell 
(1979) that the wealthy families of Boston have always been much more civic-spirited than have 
those of Philadelphia.   
  38In February 1993, the PHLX implemented a second major effort to increase order flow to 
its equity-trading floor.  At that time it began to trade selected stocks that were listed on the 
NASDAQ (1992 PHLX Annual Report).  The SEC had approved this possibility on a limited ba-
sis in 1986 and on a more extensive basis in 1990.  The Chicago Stock Exchange began to trade 
a subset of NASDAQ-listed stocks in May 1987 and attracted sufficient volume to maintain the 
effort.
  The PHLX thought that it too might attract order flow for several of the NASDAQ-listed 
stocks in which it had active options markets.  This effort was unsuccessful, however, and the 
PHLX halted trading in the NASDAQ stocks in early 1996 (Securities Week, January 7, 2002, 
p.4). 
 
Equity and index options 
As shown in Graph 11, the volume of trading in equity options on the PHLX was rela-
tively stable from 1983 to 1989.  This was despite the 1985 entry of the NYSE into the equity 
options market.  The NYSE was simply too late.  It could not use its dominance of exchange-
based equity trading to gain more than a tiny toehold in the options market.  When the NYSE 
entered the market, other exchanges had already listed the most desirable options, and dual list-
ing of options on exchange-traded stocks was not permitted.  Prior to 1990, the only way that the 
NYSE could trade an option on an exchange-listed stock was to participate in the SEC’s lottery 
for new listings.  Even after 1993, when the SEC began to allow multiple listings for all stock 
options, the NYSE, like the other exchanges, chose not to trade options that had been allocated to 
other exchanges through the lottery.  After more than a decade of fighting to build its options 
business under such restrictions, in 1997 the NYSE gave up, shutting down its options trading 
floor. 
  39Graph 11 
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  40 
The PHLX, along with other options exchanges, experienced a slump in the volume of 
options trading between 1990 and 1992.  This is commonly attributed to the end of the corporate 
takeover era associated with the 1990s failure of Drexel Burnham and the creation of more effec-
tive corporate take-over defenses (Philadelphia Inquirer, September 26, 1990, p. E10.)  In the 
late 1980s, a substantial share of the business in options came from individuals and institutions 
speculating on possible takeover targets.   
The volume of options trading on the exchanges picked up in 1992, but the PHLX saw 
very little of this.  As shown in Graph 12, the PHLX lost significant market share in equity op-
tion trades between 1989 and 1995.   Much of this decline was simply due to bad luck.  The 
PHLX did not happen to list some of the equity options that saw the highest volume of trading in 
this period.   
The luck of the PHLX turned around in the mid-1990s.  Beginning in 1996, there was 
general boom in equity option trading, much of which represented speculation or hedging in the 
stocks of high-flying technology companies.  Since many of these firms were relatively young, 
the CBOE and AMEX had not generally listed options on their stocks prior to the entry of the 
PHLX into options trading.  Thus, the PHLX had almost as substantial of a listing of options on 
the stocks of these firms as did any other exchange.  When the boom began, the PHLX was well 
positioned to participate.  As shown in Graphs 11 and 12, whether measured in absolute trading 
volume or market share, between 1996 and 1998 the PHLX saw rapid growth in trading on its 
equity options floor.  In fact, the explosive volume led to serious problems for the PHLX since 
its trade routing, executing, and reporting technologies were antiquated and could not keep up 
with the order flow in its most active options (Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1999, p. B30).  This 
hurt the reputation of the exchange and cost it potential business.   Nevertheless, as reflected in 
  41the price of seats to trade equity options, these were boom times.  The highest price paid for a 
seat to trade equity options on the PHLX in 1993 was $20,000.  By 1998, it was $305,000 (data 
provided to the author by the PHLX). 
As noted earlier, the PHLX introduced trading in sector index options in 1983.  Shortly 
afterwards, the PHLX also began to trade options on broad equity market indices.  At first there 
was only modest interest in the PHLX’s index options.  But, as shown in Graph 13, order flow 
for index options grew very rapidly between 1992 and 1999.
  Trading in the PHLX’s sector index 
options was particularly strong.  As the PHLX noted in its 1994 Annual Report, “Three of the 
Exchange’s [sector index options]… are by a significant margin the most actively traded instru-
ments of their type in the securities industry.” 
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Although equity options were a major success for the PHLX from 1984 through 1999, the 
exchange could never be sure that this success would last.  As noted earlier, over the 1980s the 
  42PHLX and the other options exchanges had a legal monopoly in the trading of many of their 
most active options.  The SEC had created this situation because of its concern that multiple list-
ings among unlinked markets would be detrimental to public investors.  
The SEC pressured the options exchanges to create a linkage system during the period 
when it allocated exclusive trading rights via a lottery.  But the options exchanges failed to create 
such a system even after a decade of discussions (Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1999, p. C20).  
Frustrated, the SEC decided to end the monopolies that the exchanges enjoyed in options listings 
while continuing to pressure the exchanges to create a linkage system.  The SEC took an incre-
mental approach.  In 1985, it decided that the right to trade options on OTC stocks would not be 
allocated through a lottery.  These options could be listed on multiple exchanges.  In January 
1990, the SEC ended its lottery system for allocating options on exchange-listed stocks.  The 
SEC ruled that henceforth any options that were listed for the first time on an exchange could be 
listed on another exchange.   These changes in policy had only a modest effect.  In August 1992, 
only 111 of 1,000 listed options traded on more than one exchange (Investment Dealers Digest, 
August 17, 1992, p. 14).  At year-end 1992, the PHLX traded 228 equity options.  Only 31 of 
these were traded on other exchanges (1992 PHLX Annual Report).   In November 1992, the 
SEC began to lift exclusive trading privileges for the approximately 500 equity options listed 
through the lottery system prior to 1990.  It did so in stages, starting with the least actively traded 
options.  By the mid-1990s all restrictions on multiple listings had been lifted, but the exchanges 
still chose not to list options that had been allocated to other exchanges under the lottery system.  
In mid-1999, for example, about 60 percent of equity options still traded on only one exchange, 
and these included most of the most active options (Financial Times, August 19, 1999, p. 28).   
The PHLX, for example, was the only exchange to trade options in Dell Computers prior to late 
  431999.  This was an extremely active option --- it alone accounted for 30 to 50 percent of the vol-
ume in equity options on the PHLX during much of 1999.  
Despite the strong volume of order flow to the PHLX options floor in early 1999, many 
people were highly pessimistic about the continuing health of this business.  And, in fact, a num-
ber of the threats that they worried about quickly came to fruition.  Several large securities firms, 
for example, announced in 1998 that they were investing in the creation of an all-electronic op-
tions exchange, to be known as the International Securities Exchange (ISE).  The backers of the 
ISE also announced that this exchange would trade popular option contracts traded on other ex-
changes.  In other words, it planned to break the monopolies that the exchanges had enjoyed in 
many options listings.   
A second threat was the escalating pressure that the SEC and U.S. Justice Department 
were applying to induce the options exchanges to list the other exchanges’ active options.  By the 
late 1990s, the reluctance of the options exchanges to compete for other exchanges’ listed op-
tions led the SEC and the Justice Department to charge that there was a “gentlemen’s agreement” 
among the exchanges not to compete.  Both agencies filed suit.  The exchanges denied the charge 
but, in 2000, they agreed to spend millions to improve self-regulation as part of a settlement with 
the Justice Department and SEC.  The PHLX, in particular, committed to spend $8 million.  The 
PHLX also paid $2.8 million in 2000 to settle a class action lawsuit accusing it of increasing op-
tion spreads by squelching competition.  
By late 1999, litigation threats from the SEC and Justice Department and the threat by the 
ISE to list other exchange’s option contracts finally had the result that the SEC desired.  In Au-
gust 1999 the CBOE and AMEX broke the alleged gentlemen’s agreement when they began to 
trade options in Dell Computers.  They immediately attracted a significant share of the Dell order 
  44flow away from the PHLX.   Not surprisingly, the PHLX retaliated by listing several of the most 
actively traded options listed on the CBOE and AMEX (New York Times, August 24, 1999, p. 
C3).
31   
  Options traders on the floor of the PHLX did have some good news in 1999.  As was 
noted earlier, in the mid-1990s the computerized trading systems of the PHLX, especially for 
options, were antiquated and could not handle especially high volumes of trading activity.  Gain-
ing access to better trading technology had been much of the impetus for the merger discussions 
of the late 1990s.  While those discussions were underway, the PHLX began a costly, but inten-
tionally low profile, internal effort to improve its systems.  In early 1999, almost at the same time 
as it announced that merger plans with the AMEX were no longer under consideration, it un-
veiled new computerized trading systems (Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1999, p. B30).  The sys-
tems were widely recognized to be state-of-the-art.  The trading technology of the PHLX ceased 
to be an issue impeding its success.    
 
Currency options 
As the PHLX worked to promote its fledgling currency options market, large commercial 
banks and investments banks increasingly began to write tailor-made currency option contracts 
for their corporate customers who were looking for better ways to hedge exchange rate risks 
                                           
31 Multiple listing occurred despite the lack of an intermarket linkage system.  In October 1999, 
SEC Chairman Levitt reprimanded the options exchanges for failing to comply with his request 
(made in February) that they link their markets.  He gave them 90 days to come up with a plan 
for doing so and they did.  In July 2001, PHLX began to phase in the "Interim Linkage" plan for 
options.  Under this plan, brokerages can route orders to a particular exchange.  If the exchange 
does not quote the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) then its specialist can match the NBBO 
or send the order to an exchange that has the NBBO.  The Options Linkage Association subse-
quently developed a long-term linkage plan under the auspices of the Options Clearing Corp 
  45(American Banker, January 24, 1984, p. 1).   The banks hedged their own net risk exposures by 
taking appropriate positions in the spot market or futures market, by trading currency options 
with each other in a developing OTC market, and by trading options on the PHLX (American 
Banker, January 17, 1985, p.16).  When the banks traded on the PHLX, their orders were gener-
ally far larger than the specialists and market makers could handle.  The banks would therefore 
use a broker to find another institution, generally another bank, willing to take the other side of 
the trade.  Once two parties agreed to the terms of the trade, they would execute it on the floor of 
the exchange.  Market makers on the floor would not interfere with these block trades.  This 
practice enabled the exchange to handle large trades smoothly and it contributed to the rapid 
growth in trading volume between 1983 and 1987 that is illustrated in Graph 14.   
Graph 14 
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(OCC).  The options exchanges began to phase in linkage to a single electronic quote system in 
early 2003.    
  46By mid-1984, it was clear that the PHLX had become the dominant trading center for 
what could become a very large market.  Financial officers at large internationally-active firms 
who never knew that Philadelphia had a stock exchange, were now acutely aware of its presence 
(Financial Times of London, October 2, 1984, p. I13).  The success that the PHLX was having 
with currency options was not lost on other exchanges, several of which also began to trade 
them.  The Chicago Board Options Exchange began to trade currency options in September 
1985, two years after the PHLX initiated the market.  But it could never overcome Philadelphia’s 
first mover advantage, and few traders could see any reason to divert order flow from the PHLX 
(Journal of Commerce, August 3, 1987, p. 7B).   Although the CBOE had a dominant share of 
the equity options business, the people and institutions trading currency options were not the 
same as those trading equity options, so the CBOE could not benefit from economies of scope.  
In August 1987, the CBOE withdrew from the business.
32    
Much of the order flow for currency options came from institutions in Europe, especially 
London.
33  Not surprisingly, the European exchanges resented that an American exchange domi-
nated the business.  In mid-1985, the London Stock Exchange and the London International Fi-
nancial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) started to trade currency options (Financial 
Times, August 5, 1985, p. I5).   Similarly, the French futures exchange, the Marché à Terme In-
ternational de France (MATIF), started trading currency options in early 1994 (Financial Times, 
July 28, 1994).  But none of these competitors were able to displace the dominance of the PHLX 
in exchange-traded currency options.       
                                           
32 When the CBOE stopped trading currency options, The Chicago Tribune (August 3, 1987, p. 
B7) quoted the president of the CBOE as saying, “History keeps proving that the first one there 
(in the market) is the most likely to succeed.”  
  47As shown in graph 14, after several years of rapid growth the volume of trades on the 
PHLX leveled off between 1987 and 1990.  This was primarily due to the growth of the over-the-
counter market and the creation of exchange rate bands for the European currencies that be-
longed to the European Monetary System.  The reduced volatility of these currencies relative to 
each other reduced the demand to hedge currency risks and opportunities for speculation.  Never-
theless, this was a halcyon era for many currency options traders on the PHLX who reaped sub-
stantial profits from market-making and speculating on the floor of the exchange that dominated 
currency options.  Growth in trading volume resumed with the turmoil among European ex-
change rates of the early 1990s (Philadelphia Inquirer, September 18, 1992, p. A16). 
After the peak in 1993, the volume of trading in currency options on the PHLX started a 
precipitous decline.  By 2000, trading volume was so low as to be an insignificant part of the 
business of the exchange.  This decline was mainly caused by the continued growth of the OTC 
market.  Many corporations preferred to hedge in the OTC market since banks would tailor con-
tracts to their specific needs (Investment Dealers Digest, September 7, 1992, p. 5).
34  In addition, 
the major international banks that had provided much of the order flow to the PHLX began to 
deal exclusively in the OTC market.  By the early 1990s, this market was well-developed with 
numerous very well-capitalized market makers.  As the market developed in the mid-1980s, the 
option contracts that banks traded among each other to hedge their net exposures became rather 
standardized, adding to their liquidity (Financial Times, December 11, 1985, p. III6).  As Garry 
Schinasi et al (2000, p. 64) wrote in a recent report issued by the International Monetary Fund,  
                                                                                                                                        
33 The New York Times (May 13, 1985, p. D5) quoted Nicholas Giordano, then the president of 
the PHLX, as saying, “60% of our volume in foreign exchange options comes from overseas 
hedgers and traders.”  
34 In 1994, the PHLX introduced customized currency options contracts in an effort to compete 
with the OTC, but these never gained much market share from the banks.   
  48The development of an extensive and sophisticated OTC market structure in the 
1980s and 1990s with many of the world’s largest financial institutions serving as 
market makers has greatly enhanced the liquidity of OTC derivatives markets.  
This, in turn, has lowered the cost of participation and supported the expansion of 
the market.  Measured by notional principal, OTC derivative markets have grown 
to roughly nine times the size of those for exchange-traded derivatives … 
 
One close observer of the PHLX market provided an additional reason for why banks and 
other large institutions moved their business to the OTC market.  He explained that, as the cur-
rency options floor of the exchange grew, market makers on the floor began to behave more ag-
gressively.  They began to insist on participating in large trades that had been negotiated off the 
floor of the exchange.  This fragmented these large orders and frustrated the institutions that 
were trading such orders though the PHLX.  Many responded by shifting all of their trades to the 
OTC market.
35  
   
E.  2000 through 2002 
In 2000, members and managers of the PHLX were likely looking back on early 1990s as 
a golden era for the exchange.  For at the beginning of the 21
st century, the PHLX faced several 
serious threats to its core businesses.  The exchange continued to think strategically about how it 
might adapt to thrive, or at least survive.  It is still too early, however, to know whether the stra-
tegic adjustments that it made in the first few years of the new century will enable the exchange 
to survive the decade.  
 
Equity trading 
                                           
35 In late 1993, the PHLX tried to prevent the fragmentation of large currency option trades by 
stating that orders of more than 1,000 contracts could be required to execute at a single price (Se-
curities Week, November 15, 1993, p. 5).   Unfortunately for the PHLX, by this time most block 
  49In the case of equity trading, the exchange faced two major threats between 2000 and 
2002.  First, specialists saw a narrowing of profit margins on their trades.  One force behind the 
narrowing of spreads was the SEC-mandated conversion from pricing in fractions of a dollar to 
pricing in decimals.  Whereas prior to 1999 the narrowest possible spread was 1/16
th, or $0.0625, 
by 2001 it was one penny.  The switch to pricing in finer increments achieved exactly what its 
advocates intended.  It narrowed average spreads.  One recent study estimated that spreads nar-
rowed by about 50 percent for NASDAQ-listed securities and about 28 percent for NYSE-listed 
securities (Murphy & Krayterman, 2002, p. 18).   
A second force behind the narrowing of spreads came from pressures on market centers 
to offer prices better than the national best bid and offer (NBBO).  The SEC, in response to its 
concerns about the practice of payments for order flow, mandated that, beginning in November 
2001, brokers clearly reveal to their clients whether or not they are paid to direct orders to par-
ticular markets centers.  The market centers must, in turn, provide detailed information about the 
quality of their executions, on a security by security basis, and must reveal the percentage of 
trades taking place at prices superior to the NBBO.  In addition, the SEC indicated that brokers 
should be prepared to explain why their order routing practices were in the best interests of their 
customers.  The effect of these rulings was to put pressure on market centers to trade at prices 
that were superior to the NBBO so that brokers routing their trades to these centers could argue 
that their customers were receiving competitive prices.  But such price improvement narrowed 
the spread received by specialists and other market makers.  Pressures to offer price improve-
ments affected the PHLX as it did other market centers.  In June 1998, for example, the PHLX 
modified PACE so that it would automatically offer a price that was 1/16
th superior to the NBBO 
                                                                                                                                        
traders had already, or were planning to, shift to OTC market and were not willing to return to 
  50for many trades (PR Newswire, June 1, 1998).  Since that time, the PHLX has continued to refine 
this automatic price improvement feature.   
The narrowing of pricing spreads meant that specialists needed to conduct a much higher 
volume of business than they did previously to remain adequately profitable.  The danger is that 
specialists on the PHLX may not be able to draw sufficient volume to justify their operations on 
that exchange.  If a sufficient number of specialists withdraw from the PHLX, ultimately the ex-
change could be forced to close its equity-trading floor.   
In addition to the narrowing of trading spreads, the PHLX faced a second serious threat.  
In May 2000, under pressure from the SEC, the NYSE rescinded its Rule 390.
36  This rule had 
prevented NYSE members from acting as OTC dealers in many NYSE-listed stocks.  The elimi-
nation of the rule could lead to a significant increase in the “internalization” of trades.  Under 
Rule 390, a large brokerage firm that was a member of the NYSE could direct its trades to the 
NYSE or to a regional exchange.  As discussed earlier, it might use the regional exchange be-
cause of speed or quality of execution, because of payments for order flow, or because it was af-
filiated with a specialist on the regional exchange.  After May 2000, it did not need the ex-
changes since it could function as a market maker handling the trades internally.  If brokerage 
firms with a significant share of trading orders begin to execute the trades in-house, this would 
hurt all of the exchanges.  Those, such as the PHLX, with relatively small market shares, might 
be most severely affected.  
                                                                                                                                        
the PHLX.   
36 Rule 390, which replaced Rule 394 of the NYSE in 1976, permitted NYSE members to exe-
cute orders for customers in the third market but still prevented them from acting as dealers.   In 
1980, the SEC issued Rule 19c-3, which permitted member firms to act as dealers for stocks 
listed after April 26, 1979. By early 2000, the rule applied to 23 percent of NYSE-listed stocks 
producing 46 percent of NYSE share volume (Murphy & Krayterman, 2002, p. 19).  In May 
  51PHLX members and management were, of course, acutely aware of these threats.  The 
PHLX responded by looking for products or business relationships that might become new 
sources of order flows.  By year-end 2002, it had announced three such initiatives.  First, in mid-
2000, the PHLX announced that it would work to cultivate business relationships with fully 
computerized trading platforms, known as electronic communication networks (ECNs).  Institu-
tional investors, market makers, and broker-dealers can register with an ECN and place trades 
with it.  They typically submit limit orders.  ECNs post these limit orders on their systems for 
other registered users to see.  If an entered limit order matches another order on the system, the 
trade is executed.  Because of the NYSE’s Rule 390 and other factors, ECNs have mainly traded 
NASDAQ stocks.
37   
With the demise of Rule 390, ECNs have been trying to expand their market share in ex-
change-listed securities.
38  But to display widely and promptly their quotes for exchange-listed 
securities, ECNs need to get access to the consolidated quote system (CQS) that the exchanges 
use.  ECNs, as with OTC market makers that trade exchange-listed stocks, can show their quotes 
on NASDAQ’s Computer Assisted Execution System (CAES) which interfaces with the Inter-
market Trading System (ITS) that links the quotes and routing of trades across the exchanges.  
But many ECNs want no part of the ITS because they consider it to be unreliable and slow 
(McAndrews and Stefanadis, 2000).  For one thing, when exchange A sends exchange B a com-
mitment to trade, Exchange B has up to two minutes to respond.  For many automated trading 
operations, this is far too long to wait. 
                                                                                                                                        
2000, the NYSE eliminated Rule 390 so that now all member firms can act as OTC dealers for 
any NYSE-listed security.  
37ECNs began to operate in the late 1990s.  By early 2002, they captured about 50 percent of 
NASDAQ trading volume (New York Times, June 23, 2002, p. C7).   
  52The PHLX saw mutually beneficial opportunities as ECNs sought to increase their vol-
ume of trading in exchange-listed stocks.  For example, in June 2000 it announced an agreement 
with the Bloomberg Tradebook, an ECN that mainly serves institutional investors (Securities 
Week, June 12, 2000, p. 1).  Under the agreement, Bloomberg could go through the PHLX to 
post its quotes on listed securities on the CQS.  The PHLX, in turn, hoped to gain equity order 
flow from the Bloomberg agreement and get transaction and market data fees from any trades 
that Bloomberg generated.  The PHLX announced that it would like to strike similar deals with 
other ECNs.  In fact, the chairman of the exchange announced that the PHLX would seek to be-
come the self-regulatory organization for ECNs (Securities Week, March 19, 2001, p. 6).  The 
idea is that ECNs could join the PHLX, gaining access to the privileges of an exchange, such as 
direct access to the CQS, without having to pay for the substantial regulatory expenses associ-
ated with being an exchange.  In return, the revenue that the PHLX could earn from the new 
business generated by the ECNs could help it cover its substantial overhead expenses.  To en-
courage ECNs to send a high volume of trades to the PHLX, in early 2002 the exchange intro-
duced a flat monthly fee for ECNs, rather than a per-transaction fee (Wall Street Letter, March 
17, 2002).   
In a second effort to increase the order flow to its equity floor, the PHLX announced in 
2001 that it planned to begin trading, once again, some NASDAQ-listed equities (Security Indus-
try News, July 16, 2001).
39  But by early 2003, it still had not implemented this plan.   
In a third initiative to bolster equity trading, in November 2001 the PHLX announced that 
it would start a competing specialist program, rather than a pure primary specialist system.  That 
                                                                                                                                        
38 By 2001, ECNs had gained only about 5 percent of the volume in exchange-listed stocks 
(Murphy  and Krayterman, 2002). 
  53is, the exchange could designate more than one specialist for some equities.  It hoped that this 
would attract more order flow by improving pricing for some trades directed to the exchange and 
by increasing the size of the orders that it could fill promptly.  In addition, the exchange began a 
remote specialist system in 2002 (Securities Week, November 19, 2001, p. 3).  This allowed spe-
cialists to access PACE without maintaining a physical presence on the floor of the exchange.  
This should lower operating costs for specialists, especially those based outside of Philadelphia, 
encouraging them to become or remain active on the PHLX even as per-trade profit margins fall.  
It is unclear whether these initiatives will be able to increase or maintain the volume of 
equity trading on the PHLX, for other exchanges are taking, or have taken, similar measures, 
which may offset any gains that the PHLX might achieve.  The Boston Stock Exchange, for ex-
ample, started a competing specialist program in 1994 and remote specialist program in February 
2001.  And by early 2002, all of the regional exchanges were either trading selected NASDAQ 
stocks or had announced plans to do so (Securities Week, January 7, 2002, p. 4).  Other regional 
exchanges have also been attempting to use business relationships with ECNs to bring trading 
orders to their floors.  The ECN, Archilpelago, took over the equity trading floor of the Pacific 
Stock Exchange in 2002, effectively gaining all of the privileges of an exchange (Financial 
Times, April 3, 2002, p. 4).  In February 2002, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE) announced 
that it had reached an agreement to “print” a substantial share of the trades of Island, the largest 
ECN.  Previously, Island, which trades mainly NASDAQ stocks, had reported its trades through 
the NASDAQ reporting system.  In order to gain this business, CSE had to offer to make pay-
ments to Island based on the transaction and market-data fees that CSE would earn from Island’s 
business.  These rebates made it less costly for Island to process its trades at the CSE than to 
                                                                                                                                        
39 The 1994 Unlisted Trading Privileges Act gave exchanges the right to trade a broad range of 
  54process the same trades through the NASDAQ.  After the agreement, the CSE changed from an 
exchange that reported daily trading volume of about 5 to 10 million shares to one that reported 
daily trading volumes of about 170 million shares (Chicago Sun Times, May 23, 2002, p. 49).  
Most of this volume was in the NASDAQ stocks that Island traditionally traded.
40    
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Despite doubts about the likely effectiveness of some of the PHLX’s efforts to increase 
the volume of equity trading orders, its performance between 2000 and 2002 was solid.  As 
shown in graph 15, the number of equity shares traded on the exchange increased 15 percent be-
tween 2000 and 2002.  However, due to the decline in stock prices generally over this period, the 
                                                                                                                                        
NASDAQ securities.    
40 In July 2002 the SEC ordered the CSE to stop the rebate program. The SEC expressed con-
cerns that the exchange might not be able to afford to fulfill its proper oversight role if it rebates 
transaction and market data fees.  The SEC also worried that the rebates might encourage bro-
kerage firms to enter sham orders just to obtain the rebates.  The CSE responded to the SEC rul-
ing by “mutualizing” revenues with its members.  This maneuver allowed it to effectively con-
tinue to a form of rebate to Island.    
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Annual Report).  The decline in the average price of shares traded likely further contributed to 
the narrowing of specialists’ spreads since the bid and offer spread on a lower priced stock, all 
other things equal, tends to be narrower than that on a higher priced stock (Harris, 2003).     
 
Options  
At the beginning of 2000, the four major options exchanges (CBOE, AMEX, PHLX, and 
Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE)) were increasingly starting to list the option contracts that were 
most active on other exchanges.  This competition became even more heated when the new, all-
electronic, ISE options exchange opened for business in May 2000.  It listed option contracts ac-
tive on other exchanges.     
Many people had argued that multiple listing of options contracts might be particularly 
damaging to the PHLX since it had a relatively small market share and depended heavily on a 
small number of active options contracts.  These worries had partly motivated earlier efforts by 
the PHLX to merge with another exchange.  Contrary to these concerns, the move to multiple 
listings benefited the PHLX within the near term, partly because of the way that the PHLX man-
aged it.  When the CBOE and the AMEX began to trade the Dell options that were the backbone 
of the PHLX in the late 1990s, the PHLX immediately retaliated by permitting several of its spe-
cialists to begin trading some of the options most active on the other exchanges.  After that, 
however, it proceeded at a more deliberate pace.  The exchange would announce plans to trade 
an option contract active on another exchange.  But rather than allocating the specialist position 
to one of the firms already active on the PHLX, it would offer it to a large specialist operation 
that had not previously traded on the PHLX.  In this way, the PHLX used the opportunity to list 
  56desirable new options contracts to entice the largest and best capitalized specialist firms to be-
come active on the PHLX.
41   Since these firms could attract a high volume of order flow, this 
also brought order flow to the floor of the PHLX.   
As the exchanges competed for each other’s order flow, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the specialists on the various exchanges began to pay for order flow (Wall Street Letter, October 
25, 1999).  In July 2000, the CBOE escalated this competition by instituting a system that effec-
tively taxed all specialists and market makers to raise funds for order flow payments.  The PHLX 
announced that it opposed this exchange-sponsored system of payment for order flow.  But it 
also made clear that it would not sit on the sidelines while others took its business.  In August 
2000, the PHLX instituted a system similar to that of the CBOE but with even higher fees on its 
specialists and market makers and higher order flow payments.  As illustrated in Graph 16, this 
policy, along with the increasing presence of large specialist firms trading on the PHLX, helped 
feed a boom in PHLX order flow in late 2000 and early 2001 (Philadelphia Inquirer, January 21, 
2001, p. E1). 
 
 
                                           
41 The PHLX encouraged specialist firms that were not able to attract significant order flow to 
transfer their specialist positions to other firms that might be able to attract more business.  It did 
this by levying a fee on all specialist firms.  The fee was based on the assumption that the firms 
have 10 percent of the aggregate exchange-traded order flow in their option contacts.   
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Between July and August 2001, the CBOE, PHLX and the AMEX announced sequen-
tially that they would no longer operate exchange-sponsored systems to pay for order flow (Se-
curities Week, October 21, 2002, p. 1).  Only the ISE and the Pacific Stock Exchange continued 
their exchange-sponsored payment-for-order-flow systems.  The three exchanges that terminated 
their systems apparently did so because market makers on the floor of the exchanges complained 
that their profits from trading were too depressed to enable them to contribute to a payment-for-
order-flow fund.  There were also concerns that the practice involved the exchanges in a system 
that many people thought to be unseemly.  The termination of exchange-sponsored payments-
for-order-flow did not prevent specialists on the exchanges from paying for order flow with their 
own money.   
Although the PHLX saw strong growth in its equity options business in late 2000 and 
early 2001, trends after that raised questions about its likely success over the long term.  From 
mid-2001 through 2002, overall option volume declined as equity markets slumped.  The volume 
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which never abandoned exchange-sponsored payments for order flow, surpassed the PHLX in its 
market share of equity options trading.  Moreover, in early 2002 the Boston Stock Exchange, in 
partnership with other financial firms, announced that it would launch an all-electronic Boston 
Options Exchange, expected to begin operating in 2003 (Business Wire, October 31, 2002).   
Competition among the exchanges to attract order flow and the shift to decimal pricing 
on equities and options narrowed spreads on options and reduced the profits of many specialists 
and market makers.
 42  Competition also increased the risk for many traders since they competed 
to take larger positions.  The reduced profits and increased risk associated with trading options 
was reflected in the price of seats on the PHLX.  In 1999 a seat to trade options had sold for 
$236,000.  In 2002, the highest price paid for an options-trading seat was $105,000.  In a further 
reflection of the slump in options trading, some prominent specialist firms closed their operations 
on the PHLX.  
In response to its declining market share relative to the upstart ISE and threats from some 
specialist firms that they might leave the PHLX, in late 2002 the PHLX re-instituted an ex-
change-sponsored payment for order flow system (Wall Street Letter, November 11, 2002, p. 4).  
In doing so, it announced that it still opposed exchange-sponsored payment for order flow but 
that it would not “unilaterally disarm.”  Some market makers on the floor of the PHLX bitterly 
complained that payment-for-order-flow levies were simply transferring resources from them to 
the specialists with whom they competed (Securities Industry News, November 4, 2002).  They 
may have been partly mollified when the PHLX announced in late 2002 that it would allow mar-
                                           
42 SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt (2000) reported that “In four of the five actively traded options 
we examined, effective spreads have fallen between 22 and 44 percent since these options went 
from single exchange trading to multiple listings.” 
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their quotes to compete with those posted by the specialists.  The PHLX hoped that this reform 
would increase price competition on the floor, attracting greater order flow to the exchange.  
Between 2000 and 2002, currency option trading remained severely depressed.  Volume 
fell from 551,000 contracts traded in 2000 to 418,000 contracts traded in 2002 (2002 PHLX An-
nual Report).   At its peak, in 1993, the PHLX traded 13.1 million currency option contracts.   
 
III. Conclusions 
  At the end of 2002, it was unclear whether the PHLX would be able to survive in an in-
creasingly competitive environment for securities trading centers.  Its market share in equity 
trading was well under one percent and narrowing bid/offer spreads hurt its specialists on both 
the equity and options floors.  In equity options, the PHLX struggled to maintain its market share 
in the face multiple listings and the rise of the ISE.   
The PHLX’s strategy for survival appears to be based on two related initiatives.  First, it 
hopes to stay at the cutting edge of technology.  While it will not abandon its trading floors in the 
near term, it is clearly moving to increase the percentage of trades that are fully automated (Wall 
Street and Technology, November 1, 2002, p.14).   The main impediment to this strategy is the 
substantial investment required to stay abreast or ahead of competitors. Financing these efforts is 
especially challenging for a small exchange, such as the PHLX.  The PHLX does not benefit 
from the economies of scale that the NYSE and, to a lesser extent, the CBOE have.  In addition, 
the PHLX, as with other exchanges, sees serious threats to its traditional sources of revenue.  As 
the chairman of the PHLX stated in a recent speech (Frucher, 2001), 
Exchanges have historically made money three ways: 
•  Taxing members 
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•  And selling trade data 
But customers no longer want to pay access fees, and now very often want to be 
paid for their order flow.  In turn, specialists and market makers are shouldering 
many fees once paid by customers at a time when they are contending with profit 
pressures caused by payment for order flow, narrow spreads in the wake of deci-
malization and increasing technology costs.  Data, which has long provided ex-
changes with a reliable revenue stream, may not be so reliable in the future.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission is considering regulatory changes that 
would substantially lower, and perhaps eliminate, data fees. 
 
The PHLX has been forced to turn to its members to finance much of its recent invest-
ments in technology.  In June 2000, for example, the PHLX initiated a three-year program re-
quiring the owners of the Exchange’s 505 seats to contribute $1,500 a month to fund technologi-
cal improvements and other capital needs.  But its ability to keep imposing such levies is limited 
by the declining profitability that many of its members have experienced.  The PHLX has also 
sought to help cover the costs of its technological investments by marketing its technology to 
other market centers (Wall Street & Technology, July 2001, p. 49).  But it is unclear whether it 
will be successful in this regard.     
  The second part to the PHLX’s survival strategy is to develop strategic partnerships, per-
haps even combining its operations with that of other exchanges (Securities Industry News, June 
16, 2003).  This could bring it new order flow, would give it a partner or partners with whom it 
could share the costs of developing new trading and compliance technologies, and could bring it 
low-cost access to advanced technologies already developed by strategic partners.  
  In support of both of these efforts, in mid-2003 the PHLX announced that its directors 
had voted to convert from a member-owned organization to a for-profit stock corporation 
(Philadelphia Inquirer, July 9, 2003, p. C1).
43  Before such a move is enacted, however, it will 
have to be approved by the membership and the SEC.  Top managers at the PHLX cite a number 
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would facilitate much faster decision-making by the exchange since changes in the strategic di-
rection of the exchange would no long have to be approved by the members, many of whom 
have conflicting interests (Wall Street Letter, January 6, 2003).  And they claim that fast deci-
sion-making is especially critical in the increasingly competitive environment in which the ex-
change operates.   The management has also noted that a for-profit status could help the ex-
change raise outside funds necessary to finance technological investments.  Finally, demutualiz-
ing the exchange could facilitate the development of strategic partnerships, for it would enable 
the PHLX to issue equity to fund the purchase of ownership interests in other trading centers and 
it would enable other centers to purchase ownership stakes in the PHLX.   
  In view of the significant challenges facing the PHLX, some might consider the imminent 
demise of the oldest American stock exchange to be inevitable.  One consideration strongly ar-
gues against this.  As the account in this paper demonstrates, the PHLX has successfully con-
fronted many threatening changes in financial markets over the past 50 years and adapted to sur-
vive.  It may well be able to continue to adapt to face the new challenges.   If so, the PHLX may 
survive, but it will likely be a very different stock exchange in the years to come.   
                                                                                                                                        
43 This is a step that a number of other exchanges have taken in recent years (Steil, 2002).   
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Table 1A 
Market Shares of Dollar Volume of Equity Trades by Exchanges 
 




NYSE AMEX  CHX  PSE  PHLX  BSE  CSE 
1945 16,285 82.75 0.81  2.00  1.78 0.96 1.16 0.06 
1950 21,808 85.91 6.85  2.35  2.19 1.03 1.12 0.11 
1955 38,039 86.31 6.98  2.44  1.90 1.03 0.78 0.09 
           
1960 45,310 83.80 9.35  2.72 1.94 1.03 0.60 0.07 
1961 64,072 82.43 10.71 2.75 1.99 1.03 0.49 0.07 
1962 54,855 86.32 6.81  2.75 2.00 1.05 0.46 0.07 
1963 64,438 85.19 7.51  2.72 2.39 1.06 0.41 0.06 
1964 72,462 83.49 8.45  3.15 2.48 1.14 0.42 0.06 
1965 89,549 81.78 9.91  3.44 2.43 1.12 0.42 0.08 
1966 123,698 79.77 11.84  3.14 2.84 1.10 0.56 0.07 
1967 162,189 77.29 14.48  3.08 2.79 1.13 0.66 0.03 
1968 197,116 73.55 17.99  3.12 2.65 1.13 1.04 0.01 
1969 176,390 73.48 17.59  3.39 3.12 1.43 0.67 0.01 
1970 131,708 78.44 11.11  3.76 3.81 1.99 0.67 0.30 
1971 186,375 79.07  9.98  4.00 3.79 2.29 0.58 0.05 
1972 205,956 77.77 10.37  4.29 3.94 2.56 0.75 0.05 
1973 178,864 82.07  6.06  4.54 3.55 2.45 1.00 0.06 
1974 118,828 83.63  4.40  4.90 3.50 2.03 1.24 0.06 
1975 157,257 85.20  3.67  4.64 3.26 1.73 1.19 0.17 
1976 195,225 84.35  3.88  4.76 3.83 1.69 0.94 0.53 
1977 187,393 83.96  4.60  4.79 3.53 1.62 0.74 0.75 
1978 251,618 83.67  6.13  4.16 3.64 1.62 0.61 0.17 
1979 300,476 83.72  6.94  3.83 2.78 1.80 0.56 0.35 
1980 476,501 83.53  7.33  4.33 2.27 1.61 0.52 0.40 
1981 491,017 84.74  5.41  5.04 2.32 1.60 0.49 0.40 
1982 603,094 85.32  3.27  5.83 3.05 1.59 0.51 0.43 
1983 958,304 85.13  3.32  6.28 2.86 1.55 0.66 0.16 
1984 951,318 85.61  2.26  6.57 2.93 1.58 0.85 0.19 
1985 1,200,128 85.25  2.23  6.59 3.06 1.49 1.20 0.18 
1986 1,707,117 85.02  2.56  6.00 3.00 1.57 1.44 0.41 
1987 2,286,903 86.79  2.32  5.32 2.53 1.35 1.33 0.35 
1988 1,587,951 86.81  1.96  5.46 2.62 1.33 1.34 0.40 
1989 1,847,767 85.49  2.35  5.46 2.84 1.77 1.56 0.54 
1990 1,616,798 86.15  2.33  4.58 2.77 1.79 1.63 0.74 
1991 1,778,154 86.20  2.31  4.34 3.05 1.54 1.72 0.83 
1992 2,032,684 86.47  2.07  4.28 2.87 1.70 1.52 1.09 
1993 2,610,504 87.21  2.08  4.10 2.38 1.52 1.35 1.37 
1994 2,817,671 88.08  2.01  3.49 2.09 1.34 1.31 1.68 
1995 3,507,991 87.71  2.10  3.26 2.24 1.27 1.43 1.99 
1996 4,511,780 88.91  1.91  3.01 2.03 1.19 1.32 1.63 
1997 6,559,992 89.13  2.13  3.25 1.87 1.01 1.23 1.38 
1998 8,308,156 87.57  3.37  3.93 1.79 0.79 1.58 0.98 
1999 10,681,363 85.08  4.18  5.06 1.93 0.65 2.04 1.06 
2000 13,691,342 81.93  5.53  7.58 1.19 0.62 1.87 1.26 
2001 12,750,234 84.20  6.30  5.50 0.40 0.60 1.74 1.24 
Source:  SEC Annual Reports
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Market Share of Equity Option Sales by Exchange  








millions)  AMEX NYSE PSE  PHLX CBOE  ISE 
1973           
1974           
1975           
1976 11,734 19%  0% 1% 3% 77% 0% 
1977 10,899 17%  0% 4% 3% 69% 0% 
1978 18,953 19%  0% 4% 3% 72% 0% 
1979 23,158 26%  0% 4% 5% 60% 0% 
1980 45,873 27%  0% 4% 6% 61% 0% 
1981 41,423 33%  0% 5% 9% 54% 0% 
1982 53,660 27%  0% 5% 8% 60% 0% 
1983 59,599 25%  0% 6% 9% 60% 0% 
1984 33,822  26% 0% 8% 10% 55%  0% 
1985 29,544  28% 0% 10% 8%  53%  0% 
1986 40,054 32%  1% 9% 9% 49% 0% 
1987 53,123  31% 1% 11% 9%  49%  0% 
1988 27,164  33% 2% 10%  11% 44%  0% 
1989 40,423  27% 2% 11%  12% 48%  0% 
1990 27,219  30% 2% 12%  10% 46%  0% 
1991 27,104  34% 1% 13% 9%  42%  0% 
1992 26,586  35% 2% 12% 9%  42%  0% 
1993 33,779  34% 1% 12% 8%  45%  0% 
1994 35,883  29% 1% 14% 8%  47%  0% 
1995 50,803  29% 1% 19% 7%  44%  0% 
1996 67,862  33% 1% 15% 7%  44%  0% 
1997 104,535  33%  0% 17% 9%  40%  0% 
1998 140,261  32%  0% 16% 11%  41%  0% 
1999 260,294  28%  0% 16% 8%  48%  0% 
2000 481,440  28%  0% 17% 15%  40%  0% 
2001 258,885  28%  0% 19% 18%  35%  0% 
 
Source:  SEC Annual Reports 
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Table 3A 
Market Share of Non-Equity Option Sales by Exchange  




Total $ Volume of 
Non-Equity Op-
tions Traded (in 
millions)   AMEX  NYSE  PSE  PHLX  CBOE 
1982  50         
1983  4,624         
1984 19,160  8.3%  3.3%  0.3% 3.3%  84.7% 
1985 29,029  10.2%  2.3%  0.1% 9.5%  78.0% 
1986 47,888  12.8%  1.6%  0.1% 9.5%  75.9% 
1987 65,749  14.0%  0.7%  0.4% 7.2%  77.7% 
1988 35,456  9.4%  0.4%  0.5% 11.6%  78.1% 
1989 36,351  11.5%  0.3%  0.5% 11.3%  76.5% 
1990 51,794  8.7%  0.1%  0.2% 8.1%  82.8% 
1991 49,012  9.7%  0.1%  0.1% 10.0%  80.1% 
1992 45,590  10.3%  0.1%  0.1% 16.7%  72.8% 
1993 41,400  8.1%  0.0%  0.2% 18.3%  73.4% 
1994 58,587  4.7%  0.0%  0.1% 9.6%  85.6% 
1995 68,072  3.9%  0.0%  0.1% 7.4%  88.6% 
1996 80,243  4.9%  0.0%  0.0% 3.4%  91.6% 
1997 114,459  5.5%  0.0%  0.1% 3.3%  91.0% 
1998 128,816  5.0%  0.0%  0.0% 3.6%  91.4% 
1999 133,225  6.1%  0.0%  0.0% 4.0%  89.9% 
2000 145,660  5.5%  0.0%  0.0% 4.4%  90.0% 
2001 110,940,896  2.4%  0.0% 0.0%  4.5% 93.1% 
 




NYSE: New York Stock Exchange 
AMEX:  American Stock Exchange 
CHX:  Chicago Stock Exchange 
PSE: Pacific Stock Exchange 
PHLX: Philadelphia Stock Exchange 
BSE: Boston Stock Exchange 
CSE: Cincinnati Stock Exchange 
CBOE: Chicago Board Options Exchange 
ISE: International Securities Exchange 
 
  